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4
Xenophon on Leadership
and Moral Authority
From the powerful and monumental creations of Herodotus and
Thucydides, there is in their wake a diverse and lively stream of authors who seek to make their own mark on the genre. These authors reflect the complex political and military realities in an increasingly fragmented
nexus of Greek city‐states of the fourth century prior to Alexander the Great. Among these historians, Xenophon requires special treatment, not for an original style, nor for deep insight into human or political causation, nor for grandly dramatic presentations. In these areas he is in the shadow of the two earlier giants. Xenophon is noteworthy, among other
reasons, simply for being the sole author of this era whose entire historical corpus remains. His works fill in, from a contemporary perspective, much of the first half of the fourth century, partly because he is the one who takes up Greek affairs following Thucydides. Xenophon is also of note for affording clear narratives that convey an applied moral ethos of his age on the topics of leadership, pan‐Hellenism, and the power of divine will.
Xenophon’s self‐consciously low profile in his historical works is evi-
dent from his avoidance of prologues. He neglects to frame the narrative with a justification or a sketch of the topic at hand, as Herodotus and Thucydides had done, and he does not offer any comments on historical
methodology or thematic focus, as Thucydides does at length in his opening chapters. Instead Xenophon lets the story tell itself, in a transparently clear style and with a gradual progression of events. In the Anabasis, for example, the story of the failed expedition of the Persian prince Cyrus against his brother the king and of the perilous return of the mercenary army, the author joins the expedition as a hired soldier at the beginning but only mentions his presence for the first time at the start of Book 3, Greek Historiography, First Edition. Thomas F. Scanlon.
© 2015 Thomas F. Scanlon. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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the point where he crucially suggests a plan of action in the face of danger.
The self‐introduction, which resembles Thucydides’ similarly delayed
narrative in Book 4, chapter 104, when he briefly enters the main action, follows:
There was a man in the army named Xenophon, an Athenian, who was nei-
ther general nor captain nor private, but had accompanied the expedition because Proxenus, an old friend of his, had sent him at his home an inv
ita-tion to go with him; Proxenus had also promised him that, if he would go, he would make him a friend of Cyrus, whom he himself regarded, so he
said, as worth more to him than was his native state. After reading Proxenus’
letter Xenophon conferred with Socrates, the Athenian, about the pro-
posed journey; and Socrates, suspecting that his becoming a friend of Cyrus might be a cause for accusation against Xenophon on the part of the
Athenian government, for the reason that Cyrus was thought to have given the Lacedaemonians zealous aid in their war against Athens, advised
Xenophon to go to Delphi and consult the god in regard to this journey.
So Xenophon went and asked Apollo to what one of the gods he should
sacrifice and pray in order best and most successfully to perform the journey which he had in mind and, after meeting with good fortune, to return
home in safety; and Apollo in his response told him to what gods he must sacrifice.
When Xenophon came back from Delphi, he reported the oracle to
Socrates; and upon hearing about it Socrates found fault with him because he did not first put the question whether it were better for him to go or stay, but decided for himself that he was to go and then asked the god as to the best way of going. “However,” he added, “since you did put the
question in that way, you must do all that the god directed.” Xenophon, accordingly, after offering the sacrifices to the gods that Apollo’s oracle prescribed, set sail, overtook Proxenus and Cyrus at Sardis as they were on the point of beginning the upward march, and was introduced to Cyrus.
( An. 3.1.4–8, Brownson 1998)
The passage richly illustrates the author’s ethos; his coincidental reasons for joining the expedition; his friendship with the famous Socrates; his piety in seeking advice and help from the gods; and the self‐effacing revelation of his apparently asking the wrong question to the oracle. The
thumbnail sketch hints at deeper themes in the work, notably the role of divine providence in guiding Xenophon and the Greeks in general. And,
even though Socrates chides him for not asking whether even to join the event, it may be implicit that Xenophon’s seeking the gods’ help specifically for a safe return was a wise move, since the advice would, in the Greek view, have been crucial to the army’s successful return. We also see
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here the caution about Cyrus not being a friend of the Athenians, and
Xenophon’s emphasis on joining more out of friendship to another Greek
than out of trust in the motives of the Persian prince. The dramatic section immediately following (X. An. 3.1.11–14) describes Xenophon’s dream of a thunderbolt hitting his father’s house, which he first takes as a sign, from Zeus, of being shut in the Persian territory (Zeus representing the Persian king). But, upon waking up, he takes the vision as a warning and is moved to address the troops, urging them to defend themselves
and to seek to escape adversity. The episode further shows Xenophon as
a man of piety, but one also of leadership, clear reasoning, and rhetorical talent. Xenophon is praised by his men (X. An. 3.1.47) and put in charge of a company of the army.
Xenophon occupies an unusual position in Greek literature generally,
since he published prolifically – he wrote works of history, philosophy, politics, memoirs, and technical treatises. His works generally fall into the categories of long historical narratives, Socratic texts, and treatises, but also shorter essays on encomium, political dialogue, and institutional
analysis. All of his works convey his personal experience and a didactic manner. His uncomplicated morality stands in contrast to that of
Thucydides and comes with a less sophisticated dramatizing than that of Herodotus. Xenophon’s belief in the role of the gods emerges in his
attention to oracles and ritual, though his piety is not all‐pervasive. He takes a keen interest in moral leadership as embodied by individuals and sought vainly by states. He prizes military skill, valor, and discipline, for example in describing Agesilaus: “At this point one may unquestionably
call Agesilaus courageous; at least he certainly did not choose the safest course” (X. Hell. 4.3.19, Brownson 1922; Brownson’s translation will be used in all subsequent passages from the Hellenica).
Again, Agesilaus demonstrates piety: “For where men reverence the
gods, train themselves in deeds of war, and practice obedience to authority, may we not reasonably suppose that such a place abounds in high hopes?”
(X. Hell. 3.4.18). And Xenophon censures emotion as a basis for decisions in his criticism of Teleutias:
From such disasters, however, I hold that men are taught the lesson, chiefly, indeed, that they ought not to chastise anyone, even slaves, in anger – for masters in anger have often suffered greater harm than they have inflicted; but especially that, in dealing with enemies, to attack under the influence of anger and not with judgment is an absolute mistake. For anger is a thing which does not look ahead, while judgment aims no less to escape harm
than to inflict it upon the enemy. (X. Hell. 5.3.7)
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Xenophon’s style is a model of purity of Attic Greek, a quality that has made his texts the first choice for beginners in ancient Greek for many decades.
The flow of the work can be sweet, persuasive, and at times even gracefully poetic. The style and level of analysis in the content may seem to some naïve, but perhaps that naïveté is for appearance, and his true worth is a transparency that wins the trust and sympathy of the general reader, treated to occasional irony and humor along with a balance and wisdom of presentation.
He, perhaps more than any historian until Plutarch, embodied Dionysius
of Halicarnassus’ dictum that “history is philosophy teaching by examples”
(D.H. Rh. 11.2). We discuss here Xenophon’s two major historical works that evidence his thematic interest in his personal experience of contemporary events and in didactic discourse. The Anabasis, perhaps a product of the early 370s bc, is our first extant commentary written by a participant, relating the author’s experience as primary director of a group of mercenaries in an arduous and risk‐filled retreat to Greek territories after the expedition of Cyrus had failed to oust Cyrus’ brother Artaxerxes II as Persian ruler. The unembellished style and restrained comments set a model for later military narratives, which are epitomized by Caesar’s Gallic War. But leadership, fortitude, and fairness are the chief, implicit lessons of this text. The Hellenica was likely written over decades and was possibly published in the 350s, but it describes the events of 411 bc and following, where Thucydides’ text leaves off. The narrative extends beyond the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 bc) and continues past the Spartan Thirty Tyrants at Athens and past Spartan and Theban hegemonies, to the battle of Mantinea in 362 bc.
Xenophon was a partisan of Sparta in his life, and so his work naturally reflects disappointment in Sparta’s ultimate failure. Positive didactic lessons, again, are evident, especially through the speeches (see Dillery 1995; Gray 1989): justness and generosity, not force, are the proper foundation of harmony among states; there is meaning, not always evident, in the chaos of human affairs, namely from a divine plan (a general Herodotean point, but here emphasizing order over revenge); the study of effective leadership and of the moral behavior of individuals and states is useful not only as a model for future behavior but also as an explanation of history (essentially a Thucydidean point, but here made more heavy‐handedly).
Life and Times
As with most ancient historians, biographical evidence is slim and deductions from Xenophon’s own writings form the most secure basis for supposition (Badian 2004: 33–53; Dreher 2004: 55–70; Sordi 2004: 71–8).
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but politically inactive family, and then died shortly before 350 bc, either in Attica or in Corinth. He appears to have served in the Athenian cavalry, and he showed great knowledge of and affection for horses. He associated with Socrates and, like Plato, seems not to have been enthusiastic about democracy. He probably stayed in Athens under the Thirty Tyrants, and the amnesty of 403/2 bc likely protected him. Also like Plato, he was critical of the Thirty, and one reason for his mercenary exploits with
Cyrus may have been insecurity at home. He was among the Greeks pre-
sent at Cyrus’ defeat at Cunaxa in 401 bc, and he played a crucial role in the retreat of the Ten Thousand after that ignominious loss. He served
under Agesilaus in the Spartan expeditions of 396–394 bc in Asia and
returned to Greece with that general at the start of the Corinthian War, being present at the battle of Coronea (394 bc) when the Spartans
defeated the forces of Thebans, Argives, and Athenians (X. Hell. 4.3.15–
20). Exactly when and why Xenophon was formally exiled from Athens is
uncertain: was it during and because of his service to the Persians, his service to Agesilaus, or, specifically, his fighting at Coronea – or was it due to some other affront? He, like Thucydides, does not in any case
make an issue of it in his writing. At some point after 394 bc he was the beneficiary of an estate from the Spartans at Scillus, just south of Olympia (X. An. 5.3.7), where he probably wrote his Anabasis. He seems to have led a quiet scholarly life there, obviously benefiting primarily from
Peloponnesian, and notably Spartan, sources. He lost the land after the battle of Leuctra in 371 bc, when the Eleans recovered local estates from Spartan control. Some speculate that the exile was revoked after his son Gryllus fought and died with the Athenians allied to Sparta against
Thebes, at the battle of Mantinea (362 bc), the great victory over Thebes (X. Hell. 7.5.17). It is both a tribute to Xenophon’s objectivity and restraint and a touching personal reflection, that the historian does not name his son, but says in his account of Mantinea simply “there fell brave men among them; and those also whom they slew were manifestly of a