Greek Historiography Page 19
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
111
were misconceived, rashly planned, badly executed, and inaccurately
reported (by others) ( pace Vickers 1995: 193–200, who rejects applying the term “allegory” to the digression but argues well for the Hippias–
Alcibiades parallels that fit the argument here). In essence, several points relate to the author’s running themes of power and human nature:
1 The metaphorical “passionate desire” ( ero ̄ s) of the Athenians for the expedition (Th. 6.24) is paralleled by Alcibiades’ own literal licentiousness and by his unrestrained ambition for undertaking this
expedition to widen the Athenian empire (Th. 6.15). Ero ̄ s is also of course echoed in the sexual tensions of the “tyrannicides” and
Hipparchus. All these desires are overexercised and recall Diodotus’
warnings in the Mytilenean debate that ero ̄ s typically prompts action in the face of opposition (Th. 3.45).
2 The Athenians’ century‐old, traumatic fear and suspicion of
Hipparchus’ personal license has triggered the recall of Alcibiades
(Th. 6.15, 28, 59).
3 Thucydides implicitly equates literal and figurative ero ̄ s in assessing the ways in which passions blur productive analysis and affect real outcomes – how power is maintained or disrupted; the most egregious
example is that the Athenians of his day did not even know the name
of the tyrant or that the regime was “not oppressive toward the peo-
ple in its use of rule [ arche ̄] but managed it without arousing resentment; these tyrants actually operated with honorable conduct [ arete ̄]
and intelligence to a very great extent” (Th. 6.54, adapted); these rare qualities are otherwise praised only in Brasidas (Th. 4.81).
4 Misapprehension was a major factor in the Athenian (and Sicilian)
planning related to the expedition, in the perception of Alcibiades as
a would‐be tyrant, and in the Athenian misunderstanding of the
events around and outcome of the earlier “tyrannicides.” The misun-
derstanding of the tyrannicides episode is further linked to Thucydides’
introductory section on methodology by echoing the need to see the
“clear truth” behind events: “neither other sources nor the Athenians
themselves say anything accurate about their own tyrants nor the inci-
dent” (Th. 6.54, echoing exactly the same complaint as in the pro-
grammatic 1.20); “since [the Athenians] thought they had clear
certainty [ saphes] in the matter of the herms, the affair of the Mysteries looked all the more like the work of Alcibiades, for the same purpose
of conspiracy against the democracy” (Th. 6.61; see 1.22 on serving
readers who want to examine “the clear truth” [ to saphes]of events, and also Meyer 2008).
112
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
In sum, this digression reiterates the crucial leitmotifs of the history to this point regarding how human emotions and personal motivations too
often masquerade as concern for the public good, but in fact harm
collective interests in both the short and the long term. Though
Thucydides does not mention it, his reading public was well aware of the common lore – that the two heroes saved Athens from tyranny, whence
the public statues erected to them and a virtual “national anthem” sung in their honor (Hornblower, 2008: 437–40). So great was this misappre-hension in the minds of the Athenian public that it contributed to the
institution of ostracism against individuals who were viewed as potential tyrants. How does the digression relate to the metaphor of Athenian rule as a tyranny over others under Athens’ empire (Pericles at Th. 2.63, Cleon at Th. 3.37)? A tyranny may begin by being benevolent toward its subjects, but, if the subjects turn hostile, the ruler must be prepared to face and respond to resistance (Scanlon 1987). Ironically, the corollary
emerges in Book 6, where citizens who fear the tyranny of individuals
can, by overly emotional reaction, become just as violent as the tyrant.
With Alcibiades gone, the generals Nicias and Lamachus lead the
Athenian operations on the north coast of Sicily in 415 bc (Th. 6.62–71).
Before a battle at the River Anapus near Syracuse, Nicias delivers a military exhortation of a sort of which there are numerous examples in this author (e.g., four in Book 7) and in other historians. While we leave open the question whether the speeches were actually given, we can say that
Thucydides’ willingness to include them indicates that they perform some valuable functions in the work, such as to characterize the morale of the troops, to give the strategy of the speaker, to remind readers of the stakes and motivation, and to create empathy and suspense. In the event, the
Syracusans are routed, but without major consequences.
In Syracuse, Hermocrates, whose major speeches earlier embodied
wise strategies (Th. 4.58–64 and 6.32–5), again gives advice that
Syracusans strengthen their position; Thucydides praises him for having shown “competent skill and notable bravery in war,” demonstrating that
he is a man of action as well as of words (Th. 6.72). Thucydides’ approval suggests parallels between Hermocrates and Pericles, both being men of
strength, leadership and integrity who can “tame” democracy (Hornblower 2008: 485). The scene shifts to Camarina, where Athens sought an
alliance, and, at a conference to decide, Hermocrates’ speech appeals for alliance with Syracuse against imperialist Athens, while a responding
speech by Euphemus of Athens defends their rule as a protective
alliance born out of “fear” against Dorians (and, earlier, Persians), saying:
“When a man is a tyrant, or a city rules an empire ( arche ̄), no factor is
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
113
unreasonable if advantageous, nor akin if not trustworthy” (Th. 6.85; cf.
2.63, 3.37). Euphemus indeed turns the imperialist accusation around, to suggest that Syracuse itself is the greatest threat to the independence of Sicilian cities (Th. 6.85–7; “their aim is to rule over you … to rule Sicily themselves,” Th. 6.85). The two speeches reinvoke the theme of imperialism and the tyrant state that threads through the work (see esp. Th.
1.75), but here significantly facing off Athenian and Syracusan aims and claims, perhaps with an element of truth in both accounts. The historian selects the Camarina debate since that city has different but equal obliga-tions to the cities of the speakers (Hornblower 2008: 491–2). But the
debate also introduces a new, flawed reasoning by the Athenians that
Ionian cities need to unite against Dorian ones, as ethnicity is added to the justification (Th. 6.82; Connor 1984: 182–4). The Camarinaeans,
out of self‐interest, opt to remain neutral for the time being, though
eventually they side with Syracuse (Th. 6.88; 7.33, 58).
Though Sparta has thus far not agreed to help Syracuse, the maverick
Alcibiades, now on the run, arrives at Sparta and delivers a speech aimed at aiding and abetting this city’s war strategy (Th. 6.89–92). The speaker defends his own reputation, reveals Athens’ war plans (virtual conquest of the whole Mediterranean, Th. 6.90), and then makes specific suggestions to Sparta, notably to fortify Decelea in Attica in order to cut off Athens’
silver mines. The speech contains tantalizing factual or verbal echoes of Herodotus, namely with reference to Alcibiades’ ancestors being enemies of tyranny and leaders of the people (Hdt. 3.82; 5.66; 6.121, 123;
Hornblower 2008: 511–12). Alcibiades’ very presence in Sparta is bizarre and striking; in brilliant leadership, cleverness, and shifting allegiance he is reminiscent of the Herodotean Themistocles (invoked earlier by
Alcibiades (fragmentarily extant), in which Alcibiades compares himself to the earlier general but is shown as less brilliant (Döring 2011: 28–30).
Alcibiades continues to appear in the work and, like Themistocles, ends up in Persia. It may be that the present allusion and Alcibiades’ post‐Sicily career allude to the controversial general and the earlier passage, but against him Alcibiades comes up short in devotion to and accomplishments for his city. In this case Alcibiades does motivate Sparta to establish its base in Attica, which becomes a centerpiece in this half of the war, often called the Decelean War. In Sicily, the Athenians at Catana get reinforcements from Athens and proceed to occupy the hill site of Epipolae
above Syracuse, building an elaborate wall successfully against counter-measures of the Syracusans (Th. 6.94–103). After an ironic start to the book suggesting the overreach of empire, the Athenian hopes of victory
114
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
mount, despite setbacks from the loss of a general and the lack of local allies (Connor 1984: 185–7).
Book 7
The Athenian reversal begins with the start of this book: the Syracusans narrowly manage to save their city by maneuvers against the wall of the besiegers. Nicias despairs of winning without fresh forces and a new general from home, which is communicated bluntly in a lengthy letter that
conveys the change of morale (Th. 7.12–15). He tells the Athenians:
“Your natures are not easy to rule” (addressed to both those at home and those in the field who listen only to good news) (Th. 7.14, Connor 1984: 188). There are intimations that the ultimate defeat can happen, as it
does. But the Athenians deny Nicias permission to return and send two
generals and more forces to help, Gylippus immediately, and Demosthenes the next spring. Thucydides, we may surmise, felt that Nicias should have been recalled, as he remarked earlier that after Pericles: “the [Athenian]
senders [to Sicily] did not subsequently make decisions advantageous to the participants” (Th. 2.65), a remark also alluding to the mistake of
recalling Alcibiades (Hornblower 1991: 348).
The next large section (Th. 7.16–46) focuses mainly on the campaign
of Demosthenes in Sicily, but is scattered with chapters on the reinvigoration of the Spartans’ morale and their fortification of Decelea in Attica (Th. 7.18–20). An effect of this is the botched attempt to send 1,300
light‐armed Thracian troops to serve in Sicily with Demosthenes
(Th. 7.27–30). When they arrive too late to sail with him they are sent back home, but they stop in Boeotia with vague orders to harm the
enemy. The Athenian escort, Diitrephes, is unable to stop them from
going berserk in the village of Mycalessus, where they slaughter everyone they meet, men, women, and children, including a whole school house
full of boys: “this disaster, both unimagined and terrible beyond all
others, was second to none befalling the whole city … [Mycalessus] in
proportion to its size experienced a fate as pitiable as any in the war” (Th.
7.29–30). The historian shows regard, here and elsewhere, for fundamental human pathos, notably when military plans go awry and soldiers behave
at a raw level, not governed by Greek norms. Not all is fair in war.
Meanwhile at Syracuse the Athenians under Gylippus lose a fort (Th.
7.24) and then lose a battle, significantly because the Syracusans have made technical improvements to their triremes, out-innovating the innovative enemy (Th. 7.36–41). Thucydides says of the Syracusans and their
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
115
allies: “these cities, alone among the ones they attacked, were similar to them in their character, democratically ruled, and possessing the resources of ships, cavalry and size as well” (Th. 7.55, adapted). Being “similar in character” ( homoiotropos) is also used of only Syracuse and Athens later (Th. 8.96), and shows the historian’s psychological level of analysis of the two states in explaining why the war was so prolonged.
On his arrival Demosthenes is confident that “the power [ dunamin] of the Athenians was obviously great in every respect,” and a long sentence reveals his supposed thoughts and motivation, ending in a decision to
attack Syracuse directly (Th. 7.42). He posits two options – either the shock attack will succeed, or he will lose and withdraw without wearing out the city – not seeing that the second will turn out to be, as readers know, false (Connor 1984: 192). The land battle at night first succeeds, but there is a dramatic reversal when the Athenians are routed, which is described in a vivid narration of those forces in chaos and confusion, of yelling in the dark, of fighting one’s allies and throwing themselves off cliffs to escape (Th. 7.44). A first sea battle at Syracuse is an Athenian setback (Th. 7.50–4). The defeats are now compounded by the failure of
Athenian generals, Nicias in particular, to agree on withdrawal, and the unwillingness of the Syracusans to allow it (Th. 7.46–60). The Greeks
have a chance to get away but delay twice, the second time because of the ill omen of a lunar eclipse, special attention being paid to Nicias’ being
“indeed over‐credulous about divination and everything of the sort”
(Th. 7.50). Religious scruples cause a serious tactical mistake, but faulty collective human psychology is the real weakness. Demosthenes’ belief in the power of Athens has been proven wrong. The Syracusans then proceed to seal off their harbor to prevent Athenian escape by sea, which
leads to Thucydides’ conventional catalogue of ships before the great
final battle (Th. 7.56–9). Oddly, the catalogue details the motives of
combatant groups and reveals the author’s consistent concern with the
fundamental human motives of desire and fear: “[these were the partici-
pants] aligning themselves not out of principle or kinship so much as in accordance with the degree of advantage or compulsion each found in its lot” (Th. 7.57; Connor 1984: 195).
Prior to the great sea battle at Syracuse, we find a series of speeches encouraging the combatants before the battle, by Nicias, then by “the
generals and Gylippus,” and an emotional if conventional final exhorta-
tion by Nicias asking men to remember their wives, children, and
ancestral gods (Th. 7.61–9); Nicias also gives a moving speech before
the tragic defeat. Nicias is clearly the person best to convey the core issues and the dramatic shifts as the historian understood them. In one
116
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
sense the first speech of Nicias is a retrospective defense, to later fellow Athenians and Greeks, that all possible measures had been taken
(Th. 7.61–4). We see here also the speaker’s (or the author’s?) view of how the non‐Athenians in the navy were encouraged to take pride in
“sharing fully in the empire, even though it was ours … free as partners in our empire [ arche ̄]” (Th. 7.63). Empire, then, as in the earlier images of Pericles and other Athenians, remains an essential source of pride;
“being wondered at” comes into both Pericles’ funeral oration and
Nicias’ speech (Th. 2.41, 7.63; Rood 1998b: 183). Fame lasts even if
the empire does not, this passage suggests – presumably thanks largely to the historian’s account.
The actual narrative of the great naval battle in the harbor at Syracuse is less a technical battle description than a performable, almost cinematic, narrative of a vision of almost two hundred ships struggling desperately in a close space while onlookers’ gazes were fastened on the event (Th.
7.69–71): “[those viewing] were kept in the most painful state of all on account of the continued uncertainty of the conflict, the intensity of the fear making their bod
ies sway back and forth to match their perceptions”
(Th. 7.71). Bringing the climactic contest to life and engaging readers emotionally were legitimate and important functions of ancient literary presentations, nowhere more effective than here (see Plb. 3.43 for an imitation; Connor 1984: 196–7). Herodotus’ narrative of the battle of
Salamis (Hdt. 8.84–92), if Thucydides emulated it at all, seems bulky in comparison, but is comparable as the description of a decisive clash at sea and a major turning point late in the war – here ironically reversed, the Athenians being defeated. There may also be an ironic parallel here to the Pylos episode – ships in a narrow space, surprising the enemy and at that time enjoying a glorious Athenian triumph (Connor 1984: 197). In the
event, the Syracusan Hermocrates caps the victory by blocking any
Athenian escape, as the Greeks had not done with Xerxes’ forces after
Salamis (Th. 7.73–4; cf. Hdt. 8.108–19).
Thucydides gives an extensive account of the withdrawal, destruc-
tion, and imprisonment of the Athenian army at Syracuse: the army is in a sorry state (Th. 72–6); Nicias gives a last address (Th. 7.77); the retreat is described (Th. 7.78–83); there is a pitiable slaughter at the River
Assinarus (Th. 7.84); Nicias and Demosthenes are executed, the former
being assessed by the historian (Th. 7.86); the remnant surrender and
many die laboring in a marble quarry (Th. 7.85–7). The whole section
gives closure to the epic progress of an ill conceived and poorly strate-gized, if valiantly fought, expedition. The slaughter of fleeing forces at the Assinarus is a horrid picture of mass slaughter, evocative of the
ThucydidEs on ThE Ends of PowEr
117
description of deaths during the Plague in Book 2, but here the
dehydrated men crush one another trying to cross the river and to drink from its muddy and bloody waters as the pursuers rain down spears