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  [ adunamie ̄ s ananke ̄]” (Hdt. 7.172, Grene). This is an ironic inversion of the principle of compulsion of the stronger, and again an expression of political pragmatism over ideals.

  The Greeks at the Isthmus finally decide to take a stand on land at

  Thermopylae and on sea at Artemisium. The Persians sail and march

  southward to those points (Hdt. 7.179–200). When counting up a

  Persian force of over five million people including support personnel,

  Herodotus concludes that, among all the men in the army, “for

  handsomeness and size there was none worthier [ axioniko ̄ teros]” than Xerxes “to hold that power [ to kratos] [of supreme command]”

  (Hdt. 7.187, Grene). Kratos here is “military command,” merited by appearance, he says, possibly in an ironic comment, without mention

  of tactical skills.

  The Persian fleet is followed to the sea above Euboea, where a storm

  reduces the force by more than four hundred ships, perhaps helped by

  Greek prayers to Poseidon (Hdt. 7.188–92). Xerxes’ army encamped

  near Trachis, perhaps ominously the site of Heracles’ gruesome death,

  and the Greeks at the “hot gates,” Thermopylae, both setting the scene

  for the first great battle with Xerxes (Hdt. 7.197–201). The location is further noted as the present extent of each side’s control: Xerxes was

  “master of [ epekratee] all the country to the north” of this point, while the Greeks were in control of the parts to the west and south (Hdt. 7.201,

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  HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy Grene). Obviously conflicts very often take place at the border between two domains of kratos; Herodotus marks the impasse in summary form just prior to the great clash. Ephialtes, a local Greek, revealed to Xerxes a little‐known mountain path as a back route to Thermopylae, which

  allowed the Persians to overcome the Greeks (Hdt. 7.213).

  Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.201–39) is the place of one of the five great

  battles during the war with Xerxes, along with (in order of narration)

  those at Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. The centrality of

  Salamis between pairs of land and sea battles is given also a thematic

  importance by the historian; it is decisive and characteristic of Greek cleverness. Thermopylae displays the outstanding valor of the Spartans, while Artemisium exhibits Athenian failure. Leonidas, the Spartan king

  and hero, is the key figure at Thermopylae, in his epic‐like genealogy, his valiant decision to make a stand (spurred on by an oracle), his death, and the epic strife for his corpse. The self‐sacrificing Leonidas contrasts with the treacherous figures of Ephialtes and Demaratus. The conversa-tions of Demaratus with Xerxes frame the battle and underscore the

  Spartans as “the fairest kingship and the fairest city among the Greeks, aye, and the bravest men” (Hdt. 7.209, Grene and 7.235–37;

  Immerwahr 1966: 260–3). The Persians’ dismay at Greek culture is

  epitomized by their amazement at the exercise and grooming of the

  Spartans before battle (Hdt. 7.208–9). The strategic outcome of

  Thermopylae is less important in the story than its function as a model of Greek military and moral virtue.

  Book 8

  The ultimate Greek withdrawal at Artemisium was neither a victory nor a defeat, as the Greeks sought to live to fight another day. Though

  Artemisium compares with Thermopylae as a battle to control a narrow

  passage (see Hdt. 8.15), it more sharply contrasts with it in its good

  fortune of the storms, taken as divine favor that assists the Athenians and others in resisting a much larger force. Yet after three engagements the Greeks strategically withdraw. The battle of Artemisium (Hdt. 8.1–25) in other ways foreshadows issues of Salamis, with the introduction of a flexible and patriotic Themistocles and with internal, arguably productive, dissent among the Greeks. This also contrasts with the modus operandi

  of the Persians. Herodotus makes the explicit point that the suppression of internal quarrels, for example over fleet command ( megiston kratos, Hdt. 8.2), allowed a unity that dissolved after the Persian Wars (Hdt.

  8.3). The subsequent march of the Persians south to the oracle of Delphi

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  results in their fleeing in fear of divine portents and demonstrates divine displeasure at the invasion (Hdt. 8.37–9).

  The naval battle at Salamis is in many ways the martial climax of the

  Histories, the true turning point of the action. It is built up by the indecisive conflict at Artemisium, and by Thermopylae, a glorious but also

  indecisive event. Salamis results in the departure of Xerxes himself, and sets up the final defeats of the remnant Persians at Plataea and Mycale in Book 9. The Salamis episode occupies the biggest single battle narrative in the Histories, from 8.40 to 8.125, including the antecedents (Hdt. 8.40–82), the battle proper (Hdt. 8.83–96), and the aftermath

  (Hdt. 8.97–125) (Immerwahr 1966: 267–87). A virtual catalog of Greek

  ships gives the account a Homeric flavor (Hdt. 8.42–8). The antecedent

  chapters are noteworthy for their exposition of the internal tensions indicative of the different methods of Greek and Persian dialogue. Among the Greeks, the Peloponnesians want to withdraw to the Isthmus and build a

  wall, the Athenians to make a stand at sea after their city has been abandoned (Hdt. 8.49, 70–4). Among the Persians, the solitary wise advice

  (of Artemisia) is not taken against the majority of generals (Hdt. 8.68–9).

  On the Greek side, prominence is given to the strategy of Themistocles

  regarding how essential it was to make a united stand at Salamis versus disunity and defeat in the Peloponnese (Hdt. 8.57–64). Themistocles, a

  wily trickster hero in the mold of Odysseus, outflanks his fellow Greeks and forces the stand at Salamis by means of a duplicitous message to

  prompt Xerxes to attack before the Greeks disperse (Hdt. 8.75). There is deliberate irony in Herodotus’ account that shows the Persians following a majority view and the Greeks manipulated by one man, but behind this

  is the display of the greater flexibility and acuity of Greek strategy, whereby the sharpest leader can save the situation. The rifts among the Greeks, especially the Athenians versus the others, foreshadow the greater split leading to the Peloponnesian War of the historian’s own day.

  The battle seems to take on its own topsy‐turvy life apart from any

  commanders in chief. Xerxes sits on a “throne” from a mainland moun-

  tain facing the island and observes noteworthy actions of the generals

  (Hdt. 8.90); his men “fought with zest and in fear of Xerxes” as the king was watching them (Hdt. 8.86, Grene). Among the Persians, Artemisia is

  the most praised commander when she rams a friendly ship, in error or to evade the Athenians, and prompts Xerxes, assuming that a Greek is hit, to exclaim: “My men have become women, and my women men” (Hdt.

  8.87–8). The king’s misplaced commendation reflects on his poor

  perception and judgment. When the Greeks hesitate at first to engage,

  the phantom of a woman shouts loudly to all the Greeks: “You crazy

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  HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy Greeks, how long will you continue backing water?” (Hdt. 8.84, Grene).

  A phantom ship from the gods prevents the Corinthian commander from

  deserting during the battle (Hdt. 8.94). The inversion of normal prowess among men and women marks the event as a felicitous paradox whose successful outcome may have relied on divine favor. The Persians are com-

  pelled by a despot, but the Greeks, though as usual rivaling one other, freely display fierce courage. Almost as
if in an athletic contest, praise is meted out by the collective, first to the Aeginetans, and second to the Athenians (Hdt. 8.93). Themistocles plays no major part in the battle

  proper and, though each leader votes for himself as best for the prize of valor, the Athenian is valued as second best by all commanders and his

  unobtrusive genius is acknowledged (Hdt. 8.123–4).

  The Salamis conflict is followed by Persian and Greek councils and the

  return of Xerxes to Asia. Xerxes first prizes the advice of Artemisia, which is exactly suited to please him, namely to return home and leave Mardonius in charge of land forces to fight on; he can thereby claim victory at a distance or dissociate himself from defeat (Hdt. 8.102–3). Both are shame-

  ful options in Greek terms. Themistocles’ good advice to cut the bridge at the Hellespont is rejected, and he delays an Athenian attack on the

  king, secretly to preserve his own favor with Persia (Hdt. 8.109–11).

  Conflicting accounts of the inglorious return of Xerxes across the

  Hellespont give closure to the outbound narrative (Hdt. 8.117–20).

  The end of Book 8 and beginning of Book 9 narrate mostly events

  involving Mardonius’ forces and the Greek army leading up to the battle at Plataea (Hdt. 8.126–44 and 9.1–18; Immerwahr 1966: 140–3). On

  the theme of power alliances, we find the lengthy episode in which

  Mardonius has sent King Alexander I of Macedon as an intermediary to

  Athens. The aim was to try to forge an alliance with the Athenians and

  thereby overpower Greece by naval force (Hdt. 8.136). Alexander then

  arrives in Athens, warns the Athenians of the power ( dunamis) of the king, and urges Athens not to oppose him but come to terms (Hdt.

  8.140). The Spartan envoys beg Athens not to yield. The Athenians reply to Alexander, “We know of ourselves that the power of the Mede is many

  times greater than our own … yet we have such a hunger for freedom that we will fight as long as we are able” (Hdt. 8.143). The Athenians then

  turn to the Spartans and forcefully assert their devotion to keeping Greece free, citing famously the common blood, language, shrines, and habits

  engendered in common (Hdt. 8.144). It is a salutary pledge in the

  Greekness that transcends politics and past wars, a unity, however temporary in the Histories, that reminds readers of the principles by which Greeks could cooperate at the acme of their union. Here Herodotus

  HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy 63

  comes as close to enunciating ideals for Greece as Thucydides comes to

  recapitulating Athenian ideals in Pericles’ funeral oration.

  Book 9

  The opening chapters (Hdt. 9.1–24) not only lead up to the narrative

  of Plataea (Hdt. 9.25–89), they “reset” the people and the moods

  among the two sides. The renewed Athenian confidence and indigna-

  tion against the Persians is signified by their stoning of a solitary

  Athenian man, Lycidas, and of his wife and children, when he supports

  Mardonius’ offer of alliance with Athens (Hdt. 9.4–5). Sparta comes to

  assist Athens, while Mardonius demolishes Athens and leaves for

  Boeotia, where his cavalry has an advantage. An anecdote describes a

  Boeotian who dines with a Persian and reveals that, “within a very short time indeed, you will see but few survivors” of the many feasting

  Persians. The Persian dares not tell the prediction to Mardonius, saying:

  “what comes from God, no man can turn back … we follow in the

  bondage of necessity” (Hdt. 9.16). This is a sad lamentation of humanity, fatal inevitability, and fear of the reaction of the despot, resonant themes of the work (see, e.g., Hdt. 7.46 on mortality). Mardonius clearly has

  the “supreme power of command” ( kratos) and the erroneous strategy is his doing (Hdt. 9.42). When in the first skirmishes a magnificent

  Persian cavalry commander, Masistius, is killed, the Greeks struggle for and recover his body but do not mutilate it, as the Persians did with

  Leonidas. As the Spartan king Pausanias says: “Such actions are more fit for barbarians than Greeks; and even in them we find it a matter of

  offense” (Hdt. 9.22–5, 79).

  Plataea and Mycale are in some ways paralleled to Thermopylae and

  Artemisium, in that both supposedly happened on the same day, and the

  sea battles prefigure Athenian naval might in later years (Immerwahr

  1966: 287–90). At Plataea, a bitter dispute erupts between the Athenians and the Tegean allies over who should man the left wing in battle, a dispute echoing the divisive squabbling elsewhere in the war (Hdt. 9.26–7).

  The divine role is highlighted in the account of Plataea. The Elean seer Tisamenus aids the Spartans in reading the omens that predict victory,

  but the Persian seer Hegesistratus, also from Elis, finds the omens unfavorable for his patrons (Hdt. 9.33–6 and 37–8). Mardonius’ supreme

  hubris was to cross the local Asopus River, which the oracles specifically forbade (Hdt. 9.36, 40, 59). The Spartan king Pausanias prays to Hera

  and the Spartans offer sacrifice near her Plataean temple, after which the tide of battle seems to turn (Hdt. 9.61–2). The Persian Wars arose in

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  HErodotus and tHE Limits of HappinEss: BEyond Epic, Lyric, and LogograpHy large part as vengeance for religious transgressions, and the historian fittingly makes the divine prominent in the last great battle.

  In the event, Mardonius falls and his men are routed by Spartans,

  though his body is mysteriously not found (Hdt. 9.63–5, 84). In a post‐

  battle assessment of bravery on each side, as at Salamis, Herodotus poi-gnantly says that the sole survivor of Thermopylae, Aristodemus, was by far the bravest but others denied him that honor since he sought to die to redress his dishonor (Hdt. 9.71). The lavish quarters of Mardonius cause Pausanias “to show the stupidity of the leader of the Medes” to the other Greeks (Hdt. 9.82). Again the theme of quantity over quality characterizes the barbarians.

  The battle of Mycale immediately follows when the Samians plead with

  the Greeks to come from Delos, as they do (Hdt. 9.90–2). The prophet

  for the fleet was Deïphonus, whose father was cheated of territory but in the end given prophecy by the gods (Hdt. 9.92–4) – the lessons being

  that justice is done in the end and divine favor is with the Greeks for now, but could turn on them if they slight the gods. The Persians opt to fight near the sea but not on it. A herald’s wand mysteriously found on the

  beach is a sign that the Greeks won at Plataea on the same day, evidence of divine intervention, which encourages the Greek army (Hdt. 9.100).

  The Spartans and the Athenians fight separately but in unison, the

  Athenians driving the foe off (Hdt. 9.102). The action effectively frees the Ionians and islanders for the time being, reversing earlier oppression, though the Spartans choose not to stay and the Athenians remain in Ionia (Hdt. 9.106). The ongoing rivalry among Greeks continues, and the

  Athenians’ clinging to Ionia is a prelude to the Athenian “empire”

  (Flower and Marincola 2002: 205–7).

  A penultimate scene returns us to the court of Xerxes, an ominous

  presence that remains, highlighted by the story of Xerxes’ lust for the wife of his brother and general Masistes (Hdt. 9.108–13). This coda on Xerxes sharply contrasts Persian with Greek behavior, especially Pausanias’ kindness to a prostitute (Hdt. 9.76); it shows the weakness of Persian males and their women’s strength; it links, in ring composition with the Gyges–

  Candaules story, the fatal promise of a man to a woman; and it illustrates the despotism that the Greeks narrowly escaped (Flower and Marincola

  2002: 291–3).

  The
final, terrifying tale is a masterful prism of major themes and an

  ominous projection of the future. At Sestos the Athenians besiege and

  take the city. Artyactes, the local governor, steals the treasure of the legendary hero Protesilaus, the first Greek slain in the Trojan War (Hom. Il.

  2.700–2), and has intercourse with women in the hero shrine there, a

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  double sacrilege (Hdt. 9.116). Artyactes appropriately becomes the last pro‐Persian casualty in the Persian Wars, slain by Athenians. At the prom-ontory where Xerxes bridged the waters, the Athenians nail Artyactes to a board and hang him from it. His son is stoned in front of him. This

  crucifixion occurs at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and is ordered by Xanthippus, father of the great Pericles. The episode thus hints at a figurative crossover of power, where a brutal Athenian hegemony promises to become heir to Xerxes’ Persia (Hdt. 9.120; Tracy 2002: 315–19).

  The last chapter (Hdt. 9.122) is a flashback to the beginning of Persian imperialism, which Cyrus warned against from the outset. An ancestor of Artyactes was Artembares, who advised Cyrus that the Persians should

  move to another, more fertile land, any land of their neighbors or of

  those farther beyond, whom they could occupy and be “more wonderful”

  ( tho ̄ masto ̄ teroi) to a greater number of people. But Cyrus warns that soft lands breed soft men; so go, but be prepared to be slaves to others rather than to rule. The final injunction is to live right and to rule or be ruled.

  Xerxes embodies the moral softening that Cyrus feared.

  Conclusions

  More than has been usually appreciated, Herodotus brings to the new

  genre of history a central focus on human nature as it relates to power, desiring it, resisting it, and effecting its balance. He observes the dynamics of authority within and between cities, empires, and peoples, not by himself explicitly formulating “laws” of how or why power is established or changed, but by showing a panoply of examples from which readers can